I. Introduction
M. Kemal Atatürk spearheaded Turkish secularization with an unprecedented force during 1920-38. "Is Turkey a Mohammedan Country?,"
1 "Th e Passing of Islam in Turkey," 2 "Th e Near East Marches on: Infi dels at Home," 3 and Allah Dethroned 4 captured the shocking nature of radical secularization sweeping the Turkish society. Kemalist pressures triggered three forms of social mechanisms in instituting secularism. Exit purged opponents out of decisionmaking.
Sincere voice represented open expression of dissent against the secularist reforms. Self-subversion concealed underlying opposition to Kemalist project in the face of perceived pressures. 5 Th is essay argues that, in Turkish politics, exit and self-subversion dominated over sincere voice, consolidating Kemalist secularism. Th ese two mechanisms distorted collective decisions in the Turkish parliament to such a degree that all the secularizing reforms were unanimously approved without a single vote of dissent during the formative years of the young republic between 1920 and 1938. After explaining how the legal framework of Turkish secularism was constructed at the parliamentary level, the article focuses on the societal ramifi cations of this rapid secularization, generating ongoing disputes between secularism and Islam(ism), not only in Turkish politics but also in everyday life in Turkey. Th us, it sheds some lights on how the Turkish society today became a prisoner of its schizophrenic past.
II. Background
In the aftermath of the Second Constitutional Era (1908-18) three schools of thought responded to the apparent failure of the Ottoman Empire to cope with western modernity: Westernist, Islamist and Turkist. 6 Common to all 2 ) C. D. When the secular nationalist Young Turks were in power, they gradually introduced several reforms with the hope of saving the empire. Th ey specifically targeted old religious organizations considered barriers to modernization. As the major ideological guide in re-shaping the social structure, secularism in an Islamic context emerged as "the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam , without being derived from, or organically linked with, the principles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah." 7 In practice, the secularist reformists basically followed two complementary strategies. Th ey either broke up traditional religious institutions with a claim that such institutions had no Islamic character or provided an Islamic justification for the intended reform.
Th e fi rst strategy was useful in separating religion from daily aff airs, especially from those of the state. Th e Young Turks dropped the Şeyhülislam (Minister of Religious Aff airs) from the cabinet, restricting his authority over the evkaf (pious foundations, Arabic: awqaf ). A new ministry began to manage evkaf , along with the fi nances of all other religious institutions, such as mosques and medreses (higher schools of Islamic learning, Arabic: madrasa ) whose administration was also delegated to the Ministry of Education. Th e Ministry of Justice took control of Şeriat Courts. 8 Th e second strategy appeared with the introduction of a Family Code for the fi rst time in a Muslim country. Th e new code declared marriage a secular contract. Still included some religious provisions, the code ended the religious monopoly over an important segment of life.
9 Several other reforms aimed at 'emancipating' women through secular education that would give them a chance to participate in economic life and the professions. 10 A modifi ed Gregorian calendar (with the Islamic origin) was also put in use.
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Along with others, 12 these reforms laid down the basis for the Kemalist secularism. M. Kemal emerged as the leader of a successful national liberation movement in Anatolia in 1922. By this time the old polity had been disintegrating, but the reconstruction process had barely begun. At this critical juncture, M. Kemal seized the opportunity to put his Enlightenment ideas into practice, especially Comte's positivism and Durkheim's solidarism. 13 He indeed became the fi rst practitioner who welcomed westernization as "a positive and desirable good rather than submitting to it regretfully as a necessary evil."
14 In Arnold Toynbee's words, he set for the nation "a maximum instead of a minimum program,"
15 including a strict secularism that would force religion to withdraw from daily life. To achieve his goal, M. Kemal tolerated no opposition. In the early 1920s, M. Kemal said: "Let the people leave the politics alone for the present. … For ten or fi fteen years more I must rule. After that perhaps I may be able to let them speak openly."
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III. Th e Politics of Intimidation
Exit and self-subversion enabled the Kemalists to get secularist reforms approved by a predominantly conservative parliament. Exit ensured the absence of opposition leaders from the parliament in critical times. Hence, the Kemalist minority passed reform laws with the approval of the self-subverting deputies. Th e lack of sincere voice distorted collective decisions in instituting Neither the sovereignty nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence. … And this will be done at any price . [If you all agree on this,] it would be very appropriate from my point of view. Conversely, the reality will nevertheless be manifested in the necessary form, but in the event, it is possible that some heads will be chopped off .
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At this time, M. Kemal was swinging his hand like a sword pointing to the neck of Hoca Mustafa Efendi, an infl uential clergy. 31 Kemal's fury was upon all in opposition, forcefully suppressing overt dissidence.
32 Hoca Mustafa Efendi gave into pressure: "Pardon me, we regarded the question in another light. Now we are informed."
33 By this response all the ulema in the mixed committee approved the draft.
Th e Kemalists rushed it to the Assembly. 34 Th e chair prevented four opposing deputies from coming to the podium. A motion to voting by name-calling came to the agenda. To avoid a potential snowballing of unfavourable votes, M. Kemal demanded, "I believe that the High Assembly will unanimously adopt the principles which are destined to preserve the independence of the nation and the country for all time."
35 Galvanizing shouts of "Let's Vote! Let's Vote!" charged the chair to put the motion to vote by hand-raising. 40 Neither the dissident First Group deputies nor the nonaffi liates raised their voices. Eff ectively intimating all the opposing groups, the Kemalists in fact distorted the Assembly's collective decision.
On 1 April 1923, the First Assembly where the Kemalists coerced deputies into submission dissolved itself to prepare for the fi rst elections. 41 Th rough the two-stage election, M. Kemal attempted to create a pliable Assembly that could devote itself to Turkey's radical reconstruction. In the fi rst stage, he himself had weeded out the foreseen opposition-almost all the Second Group and the non-affi liated, and some conservative deputies in the First Group from the Assembly. 42 He mainly targeted the men of religion. He kept only ten tame clerics "who were used to make more palatable this bitter but salutary dose of [coming] laicism and to take the sting out of the predictable charges of a 'godless regime.'" 43 In the second stage, the pre-screened candidates were presented for the "approval of the people." 44 As a result, the Second Assembly included less than one-third of the incumbents.
45 Th e number of the clerics fell from around 17 per cent in the First Assembly to only 1 per cent in later Assemblies. 46 72.5 per cent of the incumbents were re-elected. 48 Even this seemingly cohesive legislative body contained a core of powerful conservative opposition.
IV. Th e Establishment of the Secular State
Th e abolition of the Sultanate terminated the political power of the Th rone that had ruled Turkey in the name of God for six centuries. 
V. Th e Triumph of Turkish Secularism
A masterful pragmatist, M. Kemal planned to immediately dissolve the offi cial Islamic institutions, placing Islam under state control. As Bernard Lewis pointed out, "Turkish Islam had always functioned on two levels; the formal, legal, dogmatic religion of the State, the schools and the hierarchy; and popular, mystical intuitive faith of the masses." 60 Offi cial Islam could jeopardize the new regime, potentially activating popular Islam. Th e Caliphate, the stronghold of offi cial Islam presented a major threat for upcoming reforms.
After depriving the Caliph of state funding, M. Kemal coaxed some journalists about his plan to abolish the Caliphate, urging a non-controversial treatment of the issue. 61 In his state of the union address on the opening day of the Assembly in March 1924, President M. Kemal advised "to liberate and to elevate the Islamic religion … from its position of being a tool of politics" 62 with the clear intention of removing Islam from the public sphere. Among the underwriters of the draft for abolishing the Caliphate, there were two devout Muslims, Şeyh Saff et and Halil Hulki Efendi, complementing its legitimacy for Islamic correctness. 63 Only Halit Bey and a furious Zeki Bey openly challenged the draft. 64 No one from the core opposition such as Rauf and Dr. Adnan that could potentially block the draft had yet arrived in Ankara. Th e absence of the opposition leaders in the parliament was critical in speeding up the process. After two long speeches, one for the abolition of the Caliphate and one against, the President put the draft on open vote. He fi rst demanded, "Th ose who accept, please raise [your] hand." Th e draft was enacted amidst the Kemalist cries "unanimously."
65 As Finefrock also observed, "Mustafa Kemal's strategy of waiting until all predominant fi gures associated with the Opposition were absent from the capital, so advantageous at the time of the Republic's proclamation, proved eff ective once again." 66 Kemalists took immediate measures against possible public outbursts. Th e day after the İzmir daily Turan was closed down for a previously published pro-Caliphate article. 67 A new decree required all the hutbes (sermons) preached in support of the Republic with no reference to the Caliph any longer.
68 Th e public generally displayed overt indiff erence. However, when the disturbances in Reşadiye, Bursa and Adapazarı 69 and the riot in Silifke, Mersin broke out, the government resolutely crushed them all. 70 Kemal's decisiveness paid off , and the expulsion of the Ottoman Dynasty from Turkey led to no major strife. 
VI. Secularization of the Codes
Turkey had already adopted certain western secular codes on technical subjects. 72 Limited attempts to modify the laws on social life left the codes of family, succession and land retaining their religious characteristics. No modernist Ottoman reformer could dare to secularize such codes, especially family law, considered sacred by Islam. Th e Şeriat Courts were still regulating social aff airs for the last six hundred years. As supreme rulers, only Kemalists completed the secularization of all the codes. After abolishing the Ministry of Şeriat along with the Caliphate, the Assembly under the control of Kemalists also terminated the Şeriat courts. Th e Constitution of 1924 delegated the exercise of judicial authority in the name of the nation to the independent courts, which were about to adopt secular codes.
On 1 March 1924, M. Kemal also demanded the secularization of civil and family law. On his advice, the Assembly rejected a civil code draft tracing the spirit of Şeriat . 73 At the convocation of a Law Faculty on 5 October 1925, he proposed codes "based on secular grounds only" with "secular mentality."
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A year later, the Assembly took up en bloc, though by way of selection, an entire system of secular law. No deputy in the Assembly disputed the new codes. 75 hands, which unanimously approved the new secular codes. 76 Turkey borrowed the civil code, the code of obligation, and of civil procedure, bankruptcy law, and other measures with regard to individual rights from Switzerland. A new Turkish commercial code was compiled from the French, Swiss and German codes. Th e penal code was transplanted from Italy.
77 Th e religious codes of taxation and land, too, were reformed. Th e new codes eliminated the reactivation of Şeriat in practice. Contrary to the Swiss Civil Code authorizing judges in the absence of laws to rule in accordance with social tradition and precedents, Turkish Code, however, required the judge to examine the related "scientifi c" data and proceedings only , deliberately preventing judges from referring to social traditions, possibly mended with Islamic elements.
78 Th e code of taxation reduced the tax on agricultural produce with the annulment of the religious tax aşar , treating one-tenth of the produce as Allah's right.
79 Th e new secular codes drove Islamic law regulating marriage, divorce, succession, etc., out of the social life. Th ey constituted an institutional framework that supported the secularization process.
It was time to formally assert and guarantee the secular characteristics of the state. In his famous six-day-long Similarly, religious references were dropped from all military and judicial oaths in the criminal courts. Only in civil courts were witnesses required to swear in the names of both God and honor. 82 Religion and its symbols practically were fl ushed out from state institutions. Even the word Allah was uttered less in the public sphere. secular Ministry of Education controlled all the schools, closing all the medreses , restricting the religion courses in other schools in terms of content and duration. Th e law only allowed the establishment of some secondary religious schools, and of a faculty of religion. 88 In only twenty-nine such schools, more than 300 instructors started educating future 2,258 imams in 1924 with mixed curriculum of science and religion. Very low levels of enrolment forced 18 of the schools to close its doors. By 1932, only two, one in İstanbul and one in Konya, left; even these closed their doors later. Th e centuries old Medrese of Süleymaniye, the Al-Azhar of Turkey, was turned into a Faculty of Religion under the state-governed İstanbul University with a revised curriculum centered on philosophy, psychology and matters of antiquarian interest, rather than on Islamic theology, off ering fewer old Islamic courses taught in Arabic and Persian, more science courses with less emphasis on religion, and no language requirement. 89 In 1933, an Islamic Research Institute with no training of theology replaced this school due to the lack of enrolment.
VII. State Control of Offi cial Islam
90
Th us, until 1949 the only mosque schools regulated by the Directorate of Religious Aff airs had educated new imams. By the early 1940s, there left only 56 mosque school with a single instructor, teaching over a thousand students out of which only 12 graduates later took an imam certifi cate for state employment. 91 Turkey did not have enough imams to preach in the mosques during the heydays of Kemalist secularism. Th us, through these two Directorates, the state would be able to "control all training for religious offi ces as well as the salaries and appointments of all religious offi cials."
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Th e great secularizing reforms of 1924 and subsequent arrangements placed offi cial Islam under strict state control without a strong reaction since "the Ulema, long accustomed to wielding the authority of the state, were unpractised in opposing it."
93 Th e Şeyh Said Rebellion of 1925 had signalled that the dervishes, the backbones of popular Islam, not the ulema posed the strongest resistance to further secularization. Th ere was still an enormous challenge for the Kemalists to secularize the public life. 
VIII. Creating a Secular Public Sphere
As the rebels demanded the restoration of Şeriat and the Caliphate, the Kemalists defi ned the rebellion as a religious reaction to secularizing reforms. 94 Later, they used it as an excuse to eliminate the entire opposition through exit and self-subversion, eradicating sincere voice from the public discourse. Th e Kemalists fi rst suppressed the Progressive Republican Party in opposition, and then accelerated secularizing reforms.
Upon receiving the news of the rebellion on 25 February 1925, the Premier Fethi, a moderate, whom M. Kemal positioned to appease the opposition, asked the Progressive Party leaders to disband the party voluntarily. 95 Displaying full support for the government, they refused. A week later, Fethi was forced to resign and İsmet become premier again. İsmet's Cabinet asked the Assembly to pass the Law on Maintenance of Order on 4 March 1925, authorizing the government to ban, at its discretion, any organization or publication for the sake of law and order. Th e two Independence Tribunals, one in the east and one in the capital, were empowered to prosecute those who would "disturb the order." Moreover, a modifi ed High Treason Law now stipulated political exploitation of religion as an act of treason punishable by death. While the army was charged with suppressing the rebellion, the Ankara Independence Tribunal banned the publication of most dailies and periodicals except Cumhuriyet , the Kemalist İstanbul daily, and Hakime-i Milliye , the Offi cial Gazette in Ankara. Several religious books disappeared from circulation.
After the state severely crushed the Şeyh Said rebellion in late May 1925, the Ankara Independence Tribunal closed down the Progressive Party at the request of the government on the grounds that it had "exploited religion for political purposes." Th e Independence Tribunals also regularly sentenced "religious reactionaries" to heavy prison terms and sometimes to death. being stigmatized as reform opponents, people habitually suppressed their religious views in public. Th e opposition was largely silenced but still not completely eliminated. Th e outbreak of the İzmir conspiracy on 26 June 1926 justifi ed the Kemalists in their eff orts for its complete elimination. Using the plot by some deputies to assassinate M. Kemal in İzmir as a pretext, the Independence Tribunal ordered the arrests of not only the former Progressive Party members (except for Rauf and Dr. Adnan who were abroad) but also all the prominent surviving members of the old Union and Progress Party, accusing them of a planned coup d'état . Th e Tribunal sentenced a total of 18 alleged affi liates to death. Th e war heroes, such as Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Refet and Cafer Tayyar, were released in response to a potential public and military discontent.
97 Nevertheless they lost their political status and exited from public life for the duration of the reforms. In Mango's words, this was the period of "measured terror" followed by the period of "reform and repression" during which it was impossible to voice any public opposition to the Kemalist secularizing policies. 98 It was time to pursue full-fl edged secularism with the motto of "Religion should be respected as long as it remains in the sphere of conscience." 
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It nullifi ed all religious orders and closed their tekkes (dervish convents, Arabic: khanqahs), zaviyes (religious cells, Arabic: zawiyahs) and türbes (religious shrines). It further forbade any citizen to be a member of orders, wear their costumes, or bear the associated titles while closing all the mescids (chapels, Arabic: masjids) attached to tekkes and türbes. Th is law also abolished the custodian offi ce of such establishments and confi scated their property. 102 As a result, huge numbers of people in Turkey were forced to perpetually engage in self-subversion. "To a large extent, the tarikats simply went underground." 103 Th e tarikats , especially Nakşibendis and religious communities such as Nurcus started secretly meeting in private homes away from the public eye. Th eir acts of self-subversion bolstered the secular public sphere.
Th is law reinforced the rise of the secular public sphere that Government Decree No. 2413 had already started on 2 September 1923. 104 Th is decree not only obligated all public employees to wear hats but also forbade anyone to wear religious costumes other than authorized persons, mainly imams . Its violations was considered criminal act punishable up to a year in prison. 105 On 25 November 1925, again in an open voting, the Assembly outlawed the fez, making the European hat compulsory. 106 Th e only opposition in the Assembly came the next day from Nureddin Paşa, an independent deputy from Bursa and one of the victorious generals in the War of Independence. He forwarded a motion declaring that compulsory western attire violated individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Th e Assembly, nevertheless, refused even to table his motion. 107 In the Ottoman Empire, distinctive headgear was used to show traditional outward marks of diff erences in nationality, occupation and religion. 108 Th e fez was a religious symbol, signifying Muslim solidarity and the superiority of Islam over the other faiths in Turkey. 109 Meddling with personal and religious life created severe disturbances in heavily conservative towns such as Sivas, Erzurum, Rize, and Maraş. 110 Th e clergy and conservative small town notables, including religious merchants who wore religious apparel to distinguish themselves from common people, reacted furiously. 111 Th e government viewed them as organized reactionary movements and adopted severe measures to crush them. Although the maximum penalty to wear a fez was a month in prison, the Independence Tribunal sentenced 18 people to death 112 for exploiting religion for political purposes. Even those wearing berets, a headgear similar to a fez, were arrested. 113 Th rough ruthless implementation of the Hat Law, the fez, an important symbol of Islam, disappeared from the public eye.
Th e ban on the veil came to the agenda of the People's Party in its annual meeting in 1935, but the Party left the issue to the discretion of the local municipalities.
114 Some municipalities (e.g. in Trabzon) tried to implement the ban, yet as a result of immediate reaction, they did not force it, but discouraged it through public pressure. Webster described the emerging secular public sphere: "As late as 1931, veiled women were not uncommon in Izmir … By 1936, one might go about Izmir for a week without seeing a single woman with her face covered."
115 Th e last act to suppress religious dress came on 3 December 1935. Again through open voting, the Assembly issued Law No. 2596 forbidding the wearing of religious garb in public.
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Th e only persons authorized to wear the religious attire in public outside the mosques were the heads of the religious communities, adding up to eight individuals. 117 Th is meant that in the public sphere, there remained only the President of Religious Aff airs in Islamic garb.
Other proposals for a new Latin script, but it was M. Kemal who put the idea into practice with an impressive speed. 118 On 1 November 1928, by raising their hands, the deputies in the Assembly unanimously approved Law No. 1353 the adoption of the new Script, making its use compulsory in all public communications within three months. 119 Starting in 1929, the number of public documents written in the old Arabic Script started to decline in the public realm along with the public signs. As Eric J. Zürcher also emphasizes, the adoption of the Latin alphabet was just "another way to cut off Turkish society from its Ottoman and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions and reorientate it towards the west." No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey.
Each of these laws was passed unanimously through open voting, leaving no room for dissent. All members in the Assembly acted in unison with a raise of hands to approve the secular reform laws. Only once, a single vote of opposition surfaced against abolishing the Sultanate. Th e proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate were also approved in the Assembly in open voting. Rarely few deputies did openly argue against the reform laws, eventually yielding to pressure to favour secular reforms. Exit and self-subversion, suppressing voices of opposition during 1920-38 mediated the secularization process through which the centuries old Islamic institutions disappeared from the public realm. Th e reform laws with their supporting decrees and regulations constituted the secular institutional framework.
X. Th e Ramifi cations of Authoritarian Secularism
Kemal's quest to "go beyond contemporary civilization," infused a rapid Western modernity into public life diluting a predominantly Muslim society and initiating one of the most visible cleavages in Turkish society today: Secularist/Islamist divide. As I explained elsewhere in detail, the very same mechanisms: exit, sincere voice and self-subversion played a pivotal role in the institutionalization of the secular public sphere in Turkey. 123 In response to secularist pressures, the combination of exit and self-subversion pushed Islamic discourse underground. As some of the infl uential fi gures of Islamist discourse, such as Mehmet Akif, left Turkey, the others engaged in selfsubversion by concealing their public religious expressions. 124 Th e secularist legal framwork created institutional pressures that forced previously religiously-oriented groups, such as religious brotherhoods and communities, to continually engage in self-subversion. Th is led to the distortion of public discourse-corpus of assertions, arguments and opinions about Islam in the public domain. Th us, the public discourse increasingly became secularized. As a product of this secularized public discourse, Kemalist secularism rooted among the new generations, especially solidifying itself within the rising Kemalist elite, including the military, and slowly creating of a substantial group of secularist activists sworn to protect the Kemalist legacy at any cost.
Despite all intimidations, Islam in the private sphere proved resilient, waiting for an opportune time to resurface in the public realm. 125 Islam survived in the daily private lives of the masses in the forms of daily habits, routines, rituals, etc. In other words, Islam(ism) created its own, in James Scott's words, "hidden transcripts," especially among the masses, silently critiquing the power of the Kemalist elite in the confi guration of everyday life in Turkey. conditions for all as it is constantly overlooking Islamic values. 127 While authoritarian secularism succeeded in converting hearts and minds of the rising elite into secularism by silencing the link between religion and the state in nation building it failed to fully suppress the eff ects of religion on the daily lives of the masses, leaving an "opportunity space" for the entreperinial politicians to carry over Islamic values into politics once Turkey switched from single party rule to multi-party rule in 1946. 128 As a reaction to this intense secularization, with the culturalization of politics, Islamist movement gradually permeated itself into the Turkish social life, demanding recognition of its long hidden transcripts in the public sphere.
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Th e contending constellation of Islam(ism) and secularism has increasingly manifested itself in Turkish public life, epitomizing itself in the veiling controversy, a subject of an increasingly confrontational debate in Turkey since the 1980s.
130 Th e veil has become an prominent symbol of political Islam. Not surprisingly, Islamists adamantly encourage veiling in the public sphere, while secularists intently discourage it, considering veiled women as a direct attack to all the secularizing reforms. In time, as I explained elsewhere, 131 an increasing
